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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TENTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S PLAIN STATEMENT RULE*

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
Petitioners, filed an age discrimination suit against respondent,2
alleging that Missouri's constitutional provision mandating appointed
state judges to retire at age 703 violated the federal Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA" or "Act"). 4 Respondent moved
to dismiss on the grounds that appointed state judges were exempt
from the ADEA's protection because they were "appointees on the
policymaking level" and therefore were excluded from the ADEA's
definition of "employee. '5 Petitioners countered that they were not
"appointees on the policymaking level" because they did not make

* This comment received the Huber Hurst Award for the outstanding case comment submitted in the Fall 1991 semester.
1. Petitioners were Missouri state judges who were appointed to office. 111 S. Ct. 2395,
2398 (1991).
2. Respondent was the Governor of Missouri. Id.
3. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 26(1).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988). The Act provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer
- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age."
Petitioners also alleged that the mandatory retirement provision for appointed judges violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
for two reasons. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2398. First, they contended that there was no rational
basis for Missouri's decision to distinguish between judges who have reached the age of 70 and
those who have not. Id. at 2406. Second, there was no rational basis for distinguishing between
judges 70 and over and other state employees of the same age who were not subject to mandatory
retirement. Id.
5. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2403. Petitioner relied on § 630(f) of the Act, which provides:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by any employer except that
the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in any
State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee
on the policymaking level or an immediate advisor with respect to the exercise of
the constitutional or legal powers of the office.
Id. (emphasis added).
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policy, but resolved factual disputes and decided questions of law.6
The United States District Court granted respondent's motion. 7 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 9 and
HELD, petitioners were exempt from the ADEA's protection because
Congress must make its intentions "unmistakably clear" in the language of the Act where interference with core state functions are
concerned. 10
The Tenth Amendment declares that "powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." '" This language was an attempt by
the Framers of the Constitution to avoid a completely centralized
government.1 2 The Tenth Amendment implies that the states possess
sovereignty concurrent with the federal government. 13 Yet the U.S.
Supreme Court has dismissed repeatedly throughout the latter half
of this century any Tenth Amendment limitation on congressional
power. '4 Thus, Congress has been given free reign to legislate, through
enumerated powers such as the Commerce Clause, 15 areas of state
governmental functions that were once thought unreachable.
In 1976, however, the Court drastically departed from its
longstanding Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. In National League
of Cities v. Usery,'6 the Court resurrected the Tenth Amendment

6. Id.
7. Id. at 2398.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2399.
10. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2404. The Court also held that Missouri's mandatory retirement
provision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the people of Missouri "rationally
could conclude that the threat of deterioration at age 70 is sufficiently great, and the alternatives
for removal sufficiently inadequate, that they will require all judges to step aside at age 70."
Id. at 2408.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
12. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 45, at 292-293 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
13. Id.
14. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The [tenth] amendment states
but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."); but see Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) ("While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as
a truism ... it is not without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional
policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the State's integrity or
ability to function effectively in a federal system.").
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. The article provides that Congress has the power to
"regulate Commerce . . . among the several States."
16. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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notion of state sovereignty as an affirmative limit upon the power of
Congress to regulate certain governmental functions traditionally reserved to the states. The case arose after Congress amended the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")' 7 to extend federal minimum wage and
hours requirements to cover state and local government employees.' 8
The petitioners argued that congressional regulation of employment
conditions for state and municipal workers infringed on state autonomy
by supplanting the state's decision regarding its employment policies.' 9
The Court held that the FLSA amendments exceeded congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause because it directly impaired
the state's freedom "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.20 According to the Court, the extension
of the FLSA amendments to state and local government regulated
matters "essential to [the state's] separate and independent existence. ' '21 Because this employment relationship was deemed an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty, '" the Court found that Congress was not regulating the states as employers, but rather the
"States as States."'
Nine years later, the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority24 rejected the decision in National League.25

17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
18. See Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), (2), 88
Stat. 55, 58-59 (Current Version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (e)(2)(C) (1974)); see also National
League, 426 U.S. at 836-37.
19. National League, 426 U.S. at 840-42.
20. Id. at 850-52. The Court listed examples of areas of traditional operation of state and
local governments, including fire protection, police protection, sanitation, public health, and
parks and recreation. Id. It added that these examples were not an "exhaustive catalogue." Id.
at n.16.
21. Id. at 844-46.
22. Id.
23. Id. The Post-National League Court evinced a balancing test developed in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), necessary for a successful
Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional legislation. Under this approach, the Court considered whether the challenged federal law regulated the states as states, whether the federal
regulation addressed matters that were indisputably attributes of state sovereignty, whether
the States' compliance with the federal law directly impaired their ability to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, and, finally, whether the relation of
state and federal interests was such that the nature of the federal interests justified state
submission. See id. at 289-90; see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 237-39 (1981) (applying
balancing test).
24. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Garcia involved a conflict over Congress' extension of the minimumwage and overtime provisions of the FLSA to employees of the publicly-owned mass transportation system in San Antonio. Id. at 533.
25. Id. at 546-47.
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Acknowledging that lower courts had failed to identify "principled
constitutional limitations" on congressional commerce power by relying
on different attributes of state sovereignty, 26 the Court found that
this type of judicial appraisal lead "to inconsistent results at the same
time that it deserve[d] principles of democratic self-governance. '27 The
Court reasoned that the rule invited unelected judges to exert their
personal biases in determining the relative merits of state policies.2s
Because of judicial uncertainty, the Garciadecision virtually abdicated judicial review of acts of Congress challenged as invasions of
state sovereignty.29 Instead, the Court held that the states must turn
to the political process and "state participation in federal governmental
action" for constitutional protection from Congress' exercise of its
Commerce Clause power.3 ° Therefore, any future substantive restraints which the Court would impose on congressional commerce
power should "compensate for possible failings in the national political
' '' l
process rather than ... dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy. 1
In South Carolinav. Baker,- the Court took Garciaa step further
and eliminated any "possibility" of a state sovereignty limitation on

26. Id. at 538. As to the four post-NationalLeague cases that applied the balancing test,
Justice Blackmun pointed out that it was "difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing
principle that places each of these cases in the first group on one side of a line and each of the
cases in the second group on the other side." Id. at 539. According to Justice Blackmun, this
result was the necessity of "identifying a traditional state function in the same way pornography
is sometimes identified: someone knows it when they see it, but they can't describe it." Id.
(quoting San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 453 (W.D. Tex.
1980), rev'd, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
27. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547.
28. Id. at 546.
29. See id. at 556. The Garcia dissenters (which included Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor) believed that judicial review of conflicts between federalism and the Commerce Clause
was necessary because Congress alone could not adequately protect state interests. Id. at 564-67
(Powell, J., dissenting), 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and 587-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 556. According to Justice Blackmun, "the principal and basic limit on the federal
commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action - the built-in restraints that our
system provides through state participation in federal governmental action. The political process
ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated." Garcia, 469 U.S. at
556.
31. Id. at 554 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)). Justice O'Connor
criticized the majority's holding that the states must look to the national election process for
protection from congressional encroachment. Such protection is unrealistic in light of changes
in the national political process that have accentuated Congress' "underdeveloped capacity for
self-restraint." Id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
32. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
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federal legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause.- The
petitioner in Baker argued that a federal act removing federal income
tax exemptions for interest earned on state and local government-issued bonds 34 violated the Tenth Amendment and constitutional princi36
ples of federalism.35 The Court held that the act was constitutional,
reaffirming that neither Garcia nor the Tenth Amendment authorized
courts to question legislation when "the national political process did
not operate in a defective manner. 37 Moreover, petitioners must show
"extraordinary defects" in the national political process.- Therefore,
whenever the political process operates properly, the Court stressed
' 39
that "the Tenth Amendment is not implicated.
When Garcia and Baker were decided, the ADEA did not yet
reach appointed state judges; but in 1986, Congress amended the Act
to protect all employees age forty and above.40 This amendment
brought the ADEA into conflict with many state laws mandating the
retirement of appointed state judges at a particular age. 41 Without an
upper age cap, the Act appeared on its face to invalidate these state
judiciary retirement laws. Nevertheless, some states have argued that
the ADEA's application to state judges directly impairs a state's ability
to structure its judiciary42 Although the lower courts have resolved
these cases on purely statutory grounds,' 3 implicit in several opinions
is the view that such application of the ADEA would impermissibly

33. Baker, 485 U.S. at 510-11.
34. The act in issue was the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, § 310(b)(1) (1982).
35. Baker, 485 U.S. at 508.
36. Id. at 513.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2, 100 Stat. 3343 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
630(a) (1988)).
41. See Note, Mandatory Retirement of State-Appointed Judges Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 476, 477 n.12 (authored by Alan L. Bushlow)
(comprehensive list of the thirty-one states currently having either constitutional or statutory
mandatory retirement provisions).
42. See, e.g., EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261, 267 (D. Vt. 1988), affd, 904 F.2d 794
(2d Cir. 1990); Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330, 332 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds,
854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988).
43. Three courts have held that appointed judges engage in policymaking activities and are
therefore excluded from ADEA protection by the "appointee on the policymaking level" exemption. See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp.
156 (N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Stout, 521 Pa. 571, 559 A.2d 489 (1989). Other courts have held to
the contrary. See, e.g., Vermont, 904 F.2d at 801; Schlitz, 681 F. Supp. at 333-34.
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intrude on a sovereign interest long perceived as falling exclusively
44
within the competence of the state.
In the instant case, the majority concluded that the tenure of state
judges is an important attribute of state sovereignty because the Tenth
Amendment and principles of federalism mandate states to retain their
integrity as separate and independent units within the federal system. 45 Such integrity is implicit within the authority of a state to
determine the qualifications of its most important government officials.46 The authority lies "at the heart of representative government." 4 Thus, federal courts must be certain of Congress' intent when
4
the constitutional balance of federal and state powers is at stake. 8
Because congressional interference with Missouri's decision to establish a qualification for their judges would upset this balance, 49 the
majority held that Congress must make its intention to do so "unmis' 50
takably clear in the language of the statute.
Moreover, the majority stated that the authority of the people of
the states to determine the qualifications of their government officials,
in light of the Commerce Clause, may be inviolate. 5 1 Conceding that
Garcia limits judicial review of acts and statutes enacted pursuant to
Congress' Commerce Clause power, 52 the majority reasoned that application of its new plain statement rule could avoid a potential constitutional problem.5 In this context, the majority refused to read the
ADEA to encompass appointed state judges unless Congress had expressed its intention in "absolutely certain" terms that such judges

44. See Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 54 ("[T]he tenure of state judges is a question of
exceeding importance to each state, and a question traditionally left to be answered by each
state. Any federal encroachment on a state's freedom of choice in this area, therefore, strikes
very close to the heart of state sovereignty."); see also Illinois, 721 F. Supp. at 159 (state's
ability to determine the tenure of its own judiciary goes to the heart of state sovereignty);
Apkins v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 401 Mass. 427, 431, 517 N.E.2d 141, 143 (1988)(the
ADEA "should not be read in derogation of a State's sovereign interest.").
45. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2399 (1991).
46. Id. at 2402.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2401.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2401 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 (1989)).
The Will plain statement rule was derived from Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234 (1985).
51. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2402-03.
52. Id. at 2403.
53. Id.
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were included. 4 Because the "appointees on the policymaking level"
language under the ADEA was so broad, it was at least arguable
whether Congress indeed had intended appointed state judges to fall
within the Act's coverage. 55 Thus, applying the plain statement rule
resulted in the majority refusing to extend the Act to reach appointed
state judges.
Although Justice White, in his concurring opinion, agreed that the
ADEA did not prohibit Missouri's mandatory retirement provision,
he strongly disagreed with the majority's plain statement rule.57 According to Justice White, the rule was contrary to the Court's Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence for two reasons.5 First, the Garcia Court
had rejected the view that the courts could identify affirmative limitations on the commerce power by relying on different attributes of
state sovereignty. 59 Because the courts lacked such ability, any test
for state sovereignty that turned on judicial determination of whether
a particular state activity was "integral" or "traditional" was deemed
"unsound in principle and unworkable in practice."6° Second, both Garcia and Baker had concluded that the states must look to the national
political process rather than to "judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity" to protect themselves against undue congressional
encroachment.61 No claim had been made that the political process by
which the ADEA was extended to the state was defective in any
manner.62 Thus, Justice White reiterated the Court's stance in Baker
that the Tenth Amendment is not implicated where the political process operates properly.6
The majority in the instant case could have approached the issue
of whether appointed state judges fall within the "appointees on the
policymaking level" exemption as one of simple statutory interpreta-

54. Id. at 2404.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2408 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
58. Id. Justice White also stated that the majority's announcement of the Will plain statement rule was unprecedented and fundamentally unsound. Id. (White, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
59. Id. at 2410.
60. Id. at 2410 (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47).
61. Id. (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 513).
62. Id. at 2411.
63. Id. at 2410-11 (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 513).
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tion.- Yet the majority chose to resolve the issue by crafting an
affirmative limitation on federal legislation affecting states under the
Commerce Clause. Indeed, the plain statement rule's function as an
affirmative limit on Congress' exercise of its Commerce Clause power
does contravene the recent Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.Both Garcia and Baker stand for the proposition that it is not for the
courts to define affirmative limits on Congress' Commerce Clause
power.- Rather, Congress alone should define and enforce any limits
on its power to regulate the states under the Commerce Clause.67
Although the majority pays homage to the "letter" of Garcia and
Baker, it simply ignores the "spirit" of these decisions in order to
restrain congressional efforts under the Commerce Clause which would
implement federal policies.
Because the majority believes that a state's decision in determining
judicial qualification and selection is a power reserved to the states
under the Tenth Amendment, the plain statement rule enables the
courts to determine if Congress intended to regulate this decisionmaking.- Yet application of the rule calls for a judicial determination of
which state activities are "integral" or "traditional." The GarciaCourt,
according to Justice White, explicitly held that judicial determinations
of this sort were clearly untenable.69 Applying the rule allows courts
to carve out state functions by making choices among favored federal
policies.70 Thus, acts such as the ADEA, which was constitutionally

64. See Id. at 2408 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment). The Court granted certiorari to decide the following question:
Whether appointed Missouri state court judges are "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" within the meaning of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
('ADEA'), 28 U.S.C. Sections 621-634 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), and therefore exempted from the ADEA's general prohibition of mandatory retirement and thus subject
to the mandatory retirement provision of Article V, Section 26 of the Missouri
Constitution.
Id. (citing Petition for Certiorari). Justice White criticized the majority on the basis that the
case represented one of pure statutory interpretation. Id.
65. See id. (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment);
see also supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
66. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556; Baker, 485 U.S. at
512; see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
67. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556; accord Baker, 485 U.S. at 513; see also supra notes 30
& 37 and accompanying text.
68. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2402.
69. Id. at 2410 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546); see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
70. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47; see also supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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extended by Congress' exercise of its Commerce Clause power to the
states 71 to combat age discrimination in the work place, 72 are merely
empty shells. Courts will simply apply the plain statement rule
whenever there is the slightest hint that state autonomy is threatened
or infringed.
Moreover, National League assumed that there were limits on
Congress' power to interfere with core state functions and that it was
the courts' responsibility to enforce those limits. 73 But Baker removed
any possibility that the federal structure imposes limitations on the
Commerce Clause. 74 According to the Garcia and Baker Court, the
remedy for federal intrusion in the states' realm of traditional state
functions was political, not judicial. 7- As members of Congress representing their respective state interests participated in the consideration and promulgation of the ADEA, the political process ensured that
the Act does not threaten state autonomy. 76 However, the Court's
plain statement rule bypasses the national political process approach
enunciated by the Garcia and Baker decisions, and provides state
protection from congressional overreaching.
Disturbed that the Garcia-Bakerstandard is a high one to overcome, the majority in the instant case has succeeded in returning
notions of state sovereignty to the judicial sphere. Even though the
plain statement rule is clearly contrary to the recent Court's Tenth
Amendment cases, it may represent the first step towards reestablishing the "Tenth Amendment immunity" balancing test developed after
National League.77 Nevertheless, the rule may toll the death knell for
policies embodied in federal acts and statutes which effect states' rights

71. See Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 241-42 (pre-Garcia case holding that extension of the ADEA
to the states was a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, not
precluded by external Tenth Amendment constraints).
72. See supra note 4.
73. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
75. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556; Baker, 485 U.S. at 513; see supra notes 30-31 & 37 and
accompanying text.
76. See Vermont, 904 F.2d at 802; accord Schlitz, 681 F. Supp. at 332.
77. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not think it incumbent
on those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am
confident, in time command the support of a majority of this Court."); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2623 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Garcia as an "endangered
precedent" that is likely to be overruled).
Since the Garcia decision, the composition of the Court has changed such that the Garcia
dissenters now represent the majority.

158
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to determine the qualifications of their government officials. The rule
even may be eventually extended to immunize all types of state governmental functions from Congress' Commerce Clause power.78 Such
extension of the plain statement rule will not only be unwarranted,
but counter-productive to societal interests inherent in congressional
legislation.
Robert A. Feldman

78. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2410 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment).

